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Abstract Mirman (1979) and Levhari and Mirman (1980) suggested a simple two person mul-
tistage game-theoretical model which sheds some light on the economic implications inherent in
the ﬁshing conﬂicts where the decisions of the competitors have an effect on the evolution of the
ﬁsh population and so, on the future expected proﬁt of the competitors. In this paper we consider
a generalization of the Levhari and Mirman Fish War Game for the case of n participants of the
conﬂict for different scenarios of hierarchical and coalition structures of countries. We derive
the equilibrium and its steady-state behavior for all these scenarios and analyze the impact which
the hierarchical and coalition structures can have on ﬁshery and ecology.
Keywords Nash equilibrium, multistage game, ﬁsh war game, cooperative behavior
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1. Introduction
In recent years a lot of international conﬂicts about ﬁshing rights in various seas and
water zones have taken place. Mirman (1979) and Levhari and Mirman (1980) sug-
gested a simple two person multistage game-theoretical model which sheds some light
on the economic implications inherent in the ﬁshing conﬂicts where the decisions of
the competitors have an effect on the evolution of the ﬁsh population and so, on the
future expected proﬁt of the competitors. Using logarithmic utility and exponential
growth functions, they showed that the noncooperative equilibrium yields a smaller
steady-state ﬁsh stock than the cooperative solution. Their model has been extended
by numerous authors. For example, Benhabib and Radner (1992) incorporated trig-
ger strategies into the resource extraction model. Fischer and Mirman (1992, 1996)
allowed for the interaction between two different species of ﬁsh. Datta and Mirman
(1999) added one more source of interdependence, each country’s affection on the mar-
ket price of ﬁsh, and characterized strategic manipulation of the market price as well
as the common property resource. One of the standard results that these studies have
shown isthattheno-coordination equilibrium isPareto-dominated by thefullcoordina-
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tion solution. The full coordination equilibrium is compared with the no-coordination
equilibrium. Under full coordination, all countries participate in coordination, and
there is a central authority that controls each country’s volume of catch. Under the no-
coordination equilibrium, each country only takes into account its own intertemporal
welfare and it does not care about other countries’ welfare.
All the above models except that of Datta and Mirman (1999), are based on two-
country settings. Nowak (2006) investigated a generalization of the game for n players
where the countries have the same facilities, Okoguchi (1991) considered the n coun-
triesmodelforthecaseofthecountriesselﬁshbehaviourandKwon(2006)investigated
partial coordination schemes for the game. It is interesting to note that the Levhari and
Mirman model of consuming of the exhausted resources was applied by Mohapatra and
Venkatasubramania (2004) to develop a dynamic game theoretic approach for choos-
ing power optimization strategies for various components (e.g. cpu, network interface
etc.) of a low-power device operating in a distributed environment.
In this paper we consider a generalization of the Levhari and Mirman Fish War
Game for the case of n participants of the conﬂict for different scenarios of hierarchical
and coalition structures of countries. We derive the equilibrium and its steady-state
behavior for all these scenarios and analyze the impact which the hierarchical and
coalition structures can have on ﬁshery.
2. Setup of the game
Suppose that there are n countries (the owners, countries) each of whom can extract a
renewable resource, e.g., ﬁsh. Following Levhari andMirman, assumethatﬁshpopula-
tion, if uninterrupted by ﬁshing, changes according to the following biological growth
rule xt+1 = xa
t where a ∈ (0,1), t = 0,1,..., and x0 is the initial level of ﬁsh at time
t = 0. The boundary point x0 = 1 is the stable steady state of the resource population
after a normalization when there is no extraction.
Agent i (i = 1,...,n) has a utility function ui to estimate the proﬁt for present
consumption of the ﬁsh in each period. We shall consider the symmetric case where the
instantaneous utility function of each country i is logarithmic, i.e. ui(·) = log(·). Let ct
i
be the present consumption of country i in period t. So, å
n
i=1ct
i ≤ xt. Let bi ∈ (0,1) be
the discount factor for country i. It is assumed that each country maximizes the total
discounted utility over ﬁnite or inﬁnite horizon if ﬁshery is managed by individual
countries. Assume further that each country get the same amount of ﬁsh in the last









The utility function has an interesting feature. If country i consumes nothing in some
period his utility is −¥. Therefore, the players cannot extract everything during the
play if the game has to be continued. Whenever they do that everybodys utility is −¥.
We will investigate this model in different scenarios of hierarchical and coalition
structures. Our goal is to get the optimal strategies in closed form. The result obtained
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in the paper essentially depends on the logarithm form and the exponential growth
of the utility function. The derived optimal strategies for different scenarios of hie-
rarchical structures and cooperation will allow us to ﬁnd the impact they produce on
ecological situation. We will show the advantage of the cooperation and demonstrate
that its impact depends on the number of countries.
3. The main results
In this Section we give a list of theorems which supply the optimal strategies of the
considered game for a few following spots of the ﬁsh war problem. First we consider
the situation of the strong competitive environment where each country tries to ma-
ximize own proﬁt and we will ﬁnd Nash equilibrium for this plot. Then we consider
the plot where all the countries make up one coalition and they jointly maximize the
sum of each country’s payoff. After that,we consider the plot where there is a strong
hierarchical structure between countries, namely, all n of them are arranged one by
one in a linear hierarchical structure consisting of n levels. The fourth plot deals with
the situation where among all the countries there is only one leader and the rest ones
compete with each other and they are the followers for the leader, so the hierarchical
structure consists of two levels.
The next theorem was proved in Okuguchi (1981) and it supplies the optimal stra-
tegy of the countries for the case of their selﬁsh behaviour.
Theorem 1. In ﬁnite horizon game the optimal strategy c1
i of country i, i = 1,...,n,















If T tends to inﬁnite then c1




















Now we consider the plot where all the countries form a coalition and they jointly
maximize the sum of their payoffs. The case where all the countries have the same
discount factor was investigated in Okuguchi (1981).
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Theorem 2. In ﬁnite horizon game for the cooperative plot (i.e all the countries ma-












If T tends to inﬁnite then c1






















Proof. For the one-period horizon (T = 1) on the ﬁrst stage (since the second one is
the last one and so, on the second stage the countries just share the ﬁsh) the objective


















































It is interesting that all the countries have the same strategy. The remaining ﬁsh popu-
















Below we give a general remak which we will employ in the proof of this and next
theorems.
Remark 1. If for one-period horizon the optimal strategies on the ﬁrst stage are of
the form c1
i =Cix0 where Ci (i = 1,...,n) are positive and å
n
i=1Ci < 1 then the total
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where Ai = log(Ci)+abilog((1−å
n
i=1Ci)/n) is independent of x0.






































where Bi = bi(Ai −alog(n)) which can be investigated similarly to the one-period






























By backward induction step by step for the T-period horizon we obtain that the optimal
strategy is given by (1). The steady-state catch (2) follows from (1) while T tends to
inﬁnity. For the steady-state level of ﬁsh we have that ¯ xc = (¯ xc −å
n
i=1ci)a and the
result (3) follows from (2). This completes the proof of Theorem 2. ￿
In the next theorem we consider the case where there is a strong hierarchical struc-
ture between countries (so, there is no direct competition between them), namely, all n
of them are arranged one by one in a linear order and they make decision about ﬁshing
sequentially.
Theorem3. ForthestronglinearhierarchicalstructuremodelLeader-Follower(where,
say, the ﬁrst level leader is country 1, the second level leader is country 2 and so on)















If T tends to inﬁnite then c1


























Proof. In the case of one-period horizon (T = 1) on the ﬁrst stage of the game the









































































































3 and so on, we obtain
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i < x0. (14)
In the case of two-period horizon, (15) and (14) and Remark 1 yields that the country










































































































3 and so on, we obtain
that the optimal strategy of the country i (i = 1,...,n) on the ﬁrst stage of the game is
given as by (7) for T = 2.
Analogouslybybackwardinductionstepbystepweobtainthattheoptimalstrategy
of country i on the ﬁrst stage of the game is given by (7) for any T. (8) and (9)
straightforward follow from (7) when T tends to inﬁnity. This completes the proof of
Theorem 3. ￿
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The fourth plot deals with the situation Leader-Followers where among all the
countries there is only one leader. The rest ones compete with each other and they
all are the followers for the leader, so this hierarchical structure consists just of two
levels. Of course, here we assume that there are at least three countries since otherwise
the plot will coincide with the plot studied in the previous theorem.
Theorem 4. In ﬁnite horizon game with one Leader (say, Leader is country 1, the





















x0, i = 2,...,n (17)
If T tends to inﬁnite then c1
i tends to ci and the steady-state level of ﬁsh is ¯ xLFs, where































is the follower to the ﬁrst country who is the leader and so each of them considers the




























, i = 2,...,n.












1), i = 2,...,n. (21)
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Then, Leader (country 1) tries to maximize the following payoff by c1
1 where c1
i for












































x0, i = 2,...,n. (23)



























x0 < x0. (24)
In the case of two-period horizon, by (22)-(24) and Remark 1, the country i = 2,...,n




























, i = 2,...,n. (25)
Then, since c1
i for i = 2,...,n are already known and given by (25), the country 1 tries







































x0, i = 2,...,n.
Analogously by backward induction step by step we obtain that the optimal strategy
of country i on the ﬁrst stage of the game is given by (16) and (17) for any T. (18),
(19) and (20) straightforward follow from (16) and (17) when T tends to inﬁnity. This
completes the proof of Theorem 4. ￿
4. Conclusions
The results obtained in Theorems 1– 4 allow to compare the behavior of the players
under different patterns of hierarchical structures and cooperation. Also, by means the
closed form of the steady-state level of ﬁsh population we can estimate inﬂuence of
ﬁshery on ecological situation assuming that the bigger level of ﬁsh population means
better ecological situation.
It turns out that the steady-state level of ﬁsh in the Leader-Follower plot is smaller
than the corresponding value for the selﬁsh plot and the last one in turn is smaller than
the corresponding value in the cooperative scenario, namely,
¯ xLF < ¯ xLFs < ¯ xNE < ¯ xc.


















































where a = 1/g1, b = å
n
i=2(1/gi).
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and the last one can be easily proved by induction.
Figure 1. The steady-state level of ﬁsh
0.6
xLF








































Now on a numerical example for three countries (n = 3) where a = 0.3, b1 = 0.9,
b3 =0.3andb2 =0.1,0.2,...,0.9(seeFigure1)wewilldemonstratehowpossiblepat-
terns of countries behaviour and also their individual facilities which can be measured
in this model by means of discount factors impact on ﬁsh population. It is interesting
that if the discount factor b2 is close to zero then cooperative behaviour essential better
for ecology than if the discount factor is close to 1. It can be explained by the fact that
if the discount factor is small the country takes into account only a few beginning in-
tervals of the game since the proﬁt for the next ones is very small and this short-sighted
politics brings a great damage to ecology. Meanwhile if the discount factor is close to
1 then it makes the country to plan its activity for longer periods hoping also on a big
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proﬁt in the future and so, if the country has a conﬁdence in future it makes it to take
care about ecology since without ecology there is no future also.
Now consider situation where there are n countries and they have the same facilities
that can be identiﬁed by the same discount factor. So, let bi = b, i = 1,...,n. Then,
























It is very interesting that the cooperative plot allows to support the same ﬁsh population
independents on the number of countries, meanwhile strong hierarchial structure like
leader-follower one leads to exponential degradation of the population. If competition
between countries or at least a part of them takes place then although some reduction
of the the population happens but it takes place not so fast as for the strong hierarchial
structure.
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